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INTRODUCTION

crisis management includes assessment of risks,
determination of the way to achieve the lowest possible (or
acceptable) level of risk, the establishment of systems and
procedures to maintain the system at an acceptable level,
the preparation (contingency planning) required to deal with
events which could take place, and the management of
response organizations and actions resulting from this
preparation when an incident occurs.

Each of these elements

has an economic cost and a key element in crisis management
is the rational allocation of these costs.

The objective of

this paper is to examine the integration of prevention,
planning and response in the management of maritime crises.
The paper concludes with a preliminary analysis of the EXXON
VALDEZ incident based upon a National Science Foundation
funded rapid assessment study conducted by the authors.
Maritime crises, involving the saving of lives and the
salvage of ships and cargo, have been a result of maritime
commerce since man first started moving goods by water.
Rescue and salvage organizations evolved throughout the
world and have historically dealt with maritime casualties
in a professional (and often heroic) manner.

The costs of

maritime casualties historically has been absorbed by a
complex system of underwriters and Prudential and Indemnity
clubs.

A turning point in maritime history occurred on

March 18, 1967 when the 117,000 dwt super tanker TORREY
CANYON stranded on the Seven Stones rocks in the area of sea
between Cornwall and the Isles of scilly.

A minor human

error caused the incident--the automatic control switch was
locked on, disengaging the helm.

(Ironically, a similar

action is believed to have contributed to the EXXON VALDEZ
incident.)

The inability of existing maritime response

organizations to deal with the 100,000 tons of escaped crude
oil was soon evident.

The maritime crisis event was

redefined:

society realized that it must somehow learn to

protect itself and the environment from the cargo released
during a maritime casualty.
Progress in dealing with this new type of crisis has
been slow.

The grounding of the tank vessel ARGO MERCHANT

off of Cape Cod in December of 1976 provided evidence that
the problems of oil spill prevention and response had not
been solved.

In a 1979 article reviewing the progress of

oil spill cleanup in the ten years since the Torrey Canyon
incident, White, Nichols and Garnett state that "little
progress has been made over the past decade to reduce the
impact of oil spills to the extent that available technology
should allow".

In a 1979 report the National Research

Council of the National Academy of Sciences stated that,
"little attention has been paid to how government and
industry would respond to a major maritime casualty
involving hazardous cargo ... [and] .. the technical
community ..• is concerned about the capability to do

In

SO.II

a 1984 Manaaement Science article, the authors stated that,
lithe problem of providing an immediate response [to an oil
spill] in areas where major environmental damage may be done
in less than 6-12 hours has not been solved or extensively
studied.

The environmental damage caused by oil spills in

these areas could be massive and the pUblic interest would
be intense.

In these areas, the national strategy fails.
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The difficulty in preparing for and responding to oil
spills stems from the fact that these are extremely rare
events with impacts far greater than those experienced
during more routine emergencies.

Society does not deal

easily with low probability high consequence events,
particularly when the risk is due to a technological hazard.
Wenk (1986) notes that the catastrophic event is
qualitatively different from less severe accidents; an
observation that is particularly true when applied to oil
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spills.
Karwan (1985) points out, for example, that, "a
large spill response strategy involves preparing for spills
over 625,000 times larger than the median spill or over
4,400 times the average spill."

Psaraftis (1985), states

that "strategic oil spill response decisions typically
involve planning horizons of considerable duration (e.g. 515 years) .
The public's attitude toward low probability, high
consequence events tends toward polar extremes.

Most people

rarely think of the event and when they do they focus on the
low probability and assure themselves that the high
consequence event will never happen and that untested
response plans will be adequate if it does.

others see only

the consequence of a catastrophic event and insist the
activity should not be allowed no matter how small the
risk. (e.g. the reaction of many people to the nuclear power
industry after the Three Mile Island incident).

This

position gains adherents immediately after a major incident
when public interest in the risk and consequences of a
catastrophic event is intensely shown for a brief period.
If, however, the event does not reoccur, interest diminishes
rapidly over time.

The public response to the risk of a

major oil spill follows this pattern, identified by Wenk
(1986) as, " the politics of risk":

neglect until some

event dramatizes an old and hidden but significant danger
and then over-reaction.

We deal routinely with the

accidents of limited consequence, but cannot deal rationally
with the catastrophic event.
In the absence of any major maritime disasters in

u.s.

waters during the last decade, concerns about the prevention
and control of hazardous cargo releases did not become major
issues.

The March 1989 grounding of the EXXON VALDEZ and

the resulting 240,000 barrel cargo release has shown that
the environmental and societal risks associated with the
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maritime transport of large quantities of hazardous cargo
cannot be ignored.

Unfortunately, the spill also

illustrated that processes which can reduce these risks are
only loosely coupled, and that the relationships between
these activities are poorly understood.

Public acceptance

of oil transport and exploration in environmentally
sensitive regions has been shaken.

The government and the

industry are being challenged to demonstrate an ability to
prevent, to plan for, and to manage a major response effort.
significant legislative and

~egulatory

decisions will be

made on the basis of this difficult demonstration.
The authors contend that an integrated examination of
the areas of risk reduction, contingency planning, and
incident response should be undertaken.

Valuable linkages

between the activities can be developed and pOlicy tradeoffs can be identified.

We define these broad areas as

follows:
Risk Reduction includes a wide range of actions which
reduce the risk of a release of a maritime hazardous cargo.
Activities which reduce the risk of ship casualties include
the siting of port facilities, the configuration and marking
of harbor channels, the control of vessel traffic and the
establishment and enforcement of personnel standards.

The

risk of a cargo release resulting from a ship casualty can
be reduced through cargo loading, handling, storage and ship
design and construction standards.
contingency Planning includes

t~ose

actions which

insure that an adequate response can be mounted to a
maritime casualty involving a hazardous cargo.

contingency

planning includes the development of accident scenarios, the
gaming of the possible consequences of these scenarios, and
the identification and creation of the organizational,
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financial, and physical resources required to minimize the
impact of these incidents.
Incident Response includes a series of related actions
intended to minimize the impact of an incident once it
occurs. They include the countermeasure actions taken to
salvage the ship and cargo.

(The National Academy terms

marine salvage as lithe middle ground between preventing
casualties and cleaning up after them").

Response

activities may include the evacuation of populations (if the
threat of toxic exposure or fire exists) and will include
all actions taken to "clean up" after the spill.

As the

EXXON VALDEZ incident shows, these actions are constrained
by the resources and organizations created through the
contingency planning process.
THE ANALYSIS OF CRISIS DECISION MAKING
Once a catastrophic event occurs, responsible disaster
managers must create an organization appropriate to the
demands of the crisis.

In order to do this, the disaster

and the decisions that will have to be made in its wake must
be anticipated.

contingency planning, in other words, must

be scenario based and decision oriented.

The generation of

realistic scenarios is critical and non-trivial.

Alyeska

based their contingency plan on two scenarios, a routine
spill and a worst case spill.

The worst case scenario

envisioned a 200,000 bbl release from a tanker in a 10 hour
periOd under ideal weather conditions.

The EXXON VALDEZ

lost 240,000 bbls in approximately 2-3 hours.

Scenario

generation is a creative, challenging task requiring
adequate time and expert participants.

War planners have

invested extensive resources generating scenarios on which
to base national strategy and tactics.

The National Academy

of Sciences (1979) produced a study of the nation's
capability of responding to a maritime hazardous materials
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incident based upon a set of skillfully created scenarios.
Nunamaker, Weber and Chen (1989) have used the University of
Arizona decision support room to facilitate the development
of crisis scenarios by senior executives of major
industries.
Contingency planners must have clear
understanding of the type of events which may occur and the
relative probability of these events.

A description of an

event is not, in itself, a scenario.

The scenario includes

a description of environmental conditions, response options,
tactical problems, and critical concerns.
Once a set of scenarios is generated, the decision
process which will create and implement the response
capability must be analyzed.

This decision process is, in

its simplest terms, one of pattern matching.

The disaster

has dimensions of location, duration, intensity, and impact.
The response will have the dimensions of people, skills,
equipment, money, and time.

Fraser (1979), for example,

discusses how realistic scenarios are critical for the
selection and sizing of response equipment.

Garry (1981)

shows how scenarios can be used to estimate resource
requirements for a state response plan.

Bellantoni et ale

(1979) used a set of scenarios to determine recommended
deployment requirements for
response equipment.

u.s.

Coast Guard pollution

Matching the resources to the problem

will require a series of decisions which must be anticipated
and analyzed during the contingency planning process.
decisions must be made?

What

What information should be

available to the decision maker when these decisions are
made?

What are the relationships between variables and

outcomes?

How are the decisions constrained by available

resources?
The output of this decision analysis is an
identification of information requirements, identification
of resource requirements and constraints, and the
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development of training scenarios for decision makers. The
decision analysis will also predict the results of optimal
response efforts and has, therefore, implications for
prevention strategies.

If, for example, oil spill

containment and vessel salvage operations would be
impossible under certain weather conditions, more stringent
vessel movement control may be justified.

THE EXXON VALDEZ:

A CASE STUDY

The authors were sponsored by the National Science
Foundation to visit the site of the EXXON VALDEZ spill and
to identify potential areas for future research.

The

research team found that decision making in the early hours
of the response effort was constrained by inadequate
planning in several ways.

The most obvious symptom of

inadequate planning was the lack of immediately available
response resources, a fact well documented in sUbsequent
government and press reports.

More subtle, but perhaps

equally serious, was the failure to anticipate the decisions
and actions which a major incident would require and to
develop information and decision aids which would support
these actions.

such computer based aids are described by

Belardo et ale

(1984), Everson (1986), Harrald and Conway

(1981), Mick and Wallace (1986), and Wallace and De Balough
(1985).

Eventually, the federal OSC, the state OSC, and

EXXON all evolved computer systems to track resource
allocations, clean up progress, availability of key
personnel, and spill movement.

These systems are relatively

sophisticated, involving large data bases and geographical
information systems, and literally hundreds of personal
computers are in use at the spill site.

Unfortunately, none

of this technology was in place at the time of the spill;
the information on resource requirements and availability,
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spill movement, and vulnerability of areas in the path of
the spill were not readily available to decision makers.
In order to identify problem areas in the decision
making process during the spill response, we constructed a
preliminary normative model of this process during the EXXON
VALDEZ incident.

A normative model is a description of what

should have happened, assuming that a decision maker had
access to all relevant information and possessed the ability
to sort and to correctly process this information.
The emergent stage of the response to the EXXON VALDEZ
oil spill was modeled with the decision analysis technique
of influence diagrams using the software package DAVID.
result, is shown in figure 1.

The

An influence diagram's

Bayesian logic is equivalent to that of a decision tree, but
it presents a much clearer visual picture of the decision
process.

As defined by Shachter (1987), an influence

diagram is a network representation of probabilistic and
deterministic variables, decisions and an objective.

The

stochastic variables are represented by single ovals,
deterministic variables by double ovals, and decisions by
rectangles.

Arrows represent the direction of influence.

An influence diagram not only shows relationships between
variables and decisions, it implies the information
requirements for decision making.

Howard and Matheson

(1984), Owen (1984), and Shachter (1984) show how the
influence diagram can be used to model complex decision
processes.

Shachter (1987) shows that if a diagram's

structure is determined and the outcomes and distributions
of key variables are specified, then the diagram may be
solved in a manner similar to a decision tree.
The process of drawing, manipulating, and analyzing
influence diagrams has been made easier by the software
package DAVID designed by Shachter (1988)
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for the APPLE

MacIntosh, SE and APPLE II computers. This package enables
the creation and rapid modification of influence diagrams
thus providing a useful means of communicating the
complexity and inter-relationships of a decision sequence.
For example, this interactive capability was used by one of
the authors to assist senior disaster service managers in
the American National Red Cross to analyze their crisis
decision making process as a first stage in the design and
development of decision aids (Harrald, 1988).
A useful interpretation of the normative influence
diagram of the EXXON VALDEZ response can be made using
simon's model of the decision making process.

In his

information processing view of cognition, the decision
making process starts with an intelligence gathering phase
which leads to the development of alternatives, or design
phase.

Once alternatives are generated, the decision maker

is able to compare alternatives and make a choice.

The

final stage is implementation.
In figure 1, the upper level of the influence diagram
represents the stochastic and deterministic variables which
must be known in order for the decision maker to make
informed strategic choices.

This corresponds to the

diagnosis, or intelligence gathering, stage of decision
making.

In the EXXON VALDEZ incident, for example, the

alternate captain of the Port was sent out to physically
board the vessel to ascertain the extent of the damage, the
stability of the vessel, and the rate of cargo loss.
The next level of the diagram represents.a series of
strategic choices, the validity of which depended heavily on
the quality of information available.

These decisions

include the decisions to offload the vessel, to initiate
salvage measures, to activate the Regional Response Team, to
initiate the staging of response resources, the activation
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of the pre-designated On Scene Coordinator organization, and
the acceptance of responsibility for clean up by EXXON.
The outputs of these decisions were the organizational
structures and resources (equipment and people) which were
available to combat the spill in the early days.

These

deterministic variables acted as constraints for the round
of tactical decisions which made up the next round of
decision making:

the use of dispersants, the allocation of

containment and removal equipment, and the use of biological
and burning agents to combat the oil.

The variables

describing the results of these decisions represent the
amount of oil removed, dispersed, burned or biodegraded.
Since this was a relatively small amount, the final round of
decision making in the initial stage of the spill response
was the allocation of booms to protect vulnerable resources,
and the replacement and augmentation of on-scene resources.
The output variable describing the completion of the
emergent stage of the spill response are variables
describing the miles of beach affected, the impact on
fisheries and bird and marine mammal popUlations.

The

influence diagram does not show the evolution of the spill
response into a massive beach cleaning operation and media
event. The diagram also does not show the goal of the
decision process during the EXXON VALDEZ incident (Which
would be indicated by a rounded rectangle).

It is not clear

from the initial analysis that decision makers had a
consistent and clear set of goals.
The diagram may be used as a basis for analyzing the
information gathering, processing and alternative generation
which occurred during the EXXON VALDEZ incident.

More

importantly, the technique shown may assist in the
development of future worst case scenarios, decision aids,
and information resources.

Similar analyses could be
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conducted for hazardous cargo scenarios where a decision
maker must make a series of countermeasure, evacuation and
mitigation decisions based upon sparse information.
ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE EXXON VALDEZ INCIDENT
During the assessment of the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill,
the authors:

interviewed federal, state, local, and

industry officials; visited command posts and clean up
sites; and were provided access to records, message traffic
and situation reports

The following is a brief summary of

issues in the prevention and management of maritime crises
which were identified in the authors' analysis.
1.

Externalities/Role of the u.s. Government/state

Government
Ocean carriers, such as tanker owners, operate in a
business environment where many externalities exist that are
outside of their control.

Nevertheless, these externalities

may have a significant impact on their operations.
Governmental bodies such as the U.S. Coast Guard, and
classification societies set standards for ship design and
periodic inspection.

The Congress has passed laws and the

u.s. Coast Guard has promulgated regulations related to the
manning standards and work rules on u.s. flag vessels.

The

USCG also licenses seagoing personnel on u.s. Flag ships.
Liability limits on ships and oil spills have been set
by external bodies.

Vessel Traffic Systems run the USCG

affect the manner in which ships enter a limited number of
ports, including Valdez.

The state of Alaska had a

substantial role in minimizing the risk of a major oil
spill. They permitted and inspected the Alyeska facility,
reviewed and approved contingency plans, and licensed state
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pilots.
(Jurisdiction over pilotage operations is
distributed between federal and state organizations.)
It is fair to ask whether all these externalities are
properly coordinated into a comprehensive package to insure
vessel safety.

Foreign governments do not handle all the

ship safety functions in the same was as the
does.

u.s.

Government

For example, the Dutch government in the Rotterdam

VTS system actively controls vessel movement in contrast to
the passive

u.s.

systems.

A comparison can also be drawn

with the airline industry, where air traffic control systems
and manning standards are handled somewhat differently.
This may be an appropriate time to take a focused,
integrated view of the maritime legal and economic
environment.
2.

Vessel Safety
Elements of Safety include:

ship design and

construction; crew training, licensing and manning
standards; licensing of pilots; and the use of safety
devices both on the ship and on the shore.

Many safety

aspects can be categorized as active or passive and internal
or external.

They can be further classified (see Baisuck et

ale 1977) as to intent:

are they designed to prevent the

casualty from occurring, to prevent a cargo release after a
casualty occurs, or to minimize the impact of that cargo
release?

To increase ship safety, one can make changes in

one or more areas.

Ship designs of double bottoms or double

hulls must be considered.
testing are possibilities.

Better training of crews and drug
Passive internal equipment

includes fathometers, radar, etc.

An active internal device

would be an electronic chart or collision avoidance system
with an alarm or a means of taking corrective action.
External factors include Vessel Traffic Systems which are
relatively passive at present when compared to the more
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active air traffic control system.

A comprehensive safety

analysis that ties together these many factors in a
coordinated and efficient manner is needed.
3.

Contingency Planning
The state of Alaska and the federal government acceptel

oil drilling, pipeline construction, and oil transportation
The state has received economic benefits.

The Alaskan

fields significantly reduce our dependence on foreign oil
and society has consciously, or unconsciously, accepted the
environmental and other risks involved.

Apparently, no one

in authority in looking at the regional contingency plan or
Alyeska plan, seriously considered that a 240,000 bbl spill
could or would take place. The regional contingency plan wa:
inadequate for a 200,000 . to 240,00 bbl spill, mainly
because of the limits of technology used (which were not
fully revealed in the plans because the response scenarios
were not fully developed).
for example,

A 1977 EXXON USA article stated

that "while exercising every precaution to

prevent an oil spill [in Prince William Sound] Alyeska has
detailed plans to clean up a spill should one occur".
state accepted Alyeska's plan.

The

Based on existing technology

and experience in past oil spills, it is unreasonable to
assume that in a major oil spill, more than 20-30% of the
oil will be picked up mechanically, treated with
dispersants, or burned.

The majority of the oil will hit

the beach, a fact that was not recognized in contingency
plans.

The labor intensive nature of the beach cleaning

operation was unanticipated.
The federal, state and corporate organizations which
evolved after the spill did not conform to any
organizational structures anticipated in the contingency
planning process.

This hampered the spill response and

inter-organizational cooperation.
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None of the plans

anticipated that the affected
would

oil company, not Alyeska,

actually run the pollution response during a major

incident.

The federal on-scene coordinator and the state

organization did not evolve into stable, smoothly
functioning organizations until after the opportunity to
deal with the free oil had elapsed.

Most of the resources

brought to the scene by EXXON and by the government arrived
after this time.

The threat of 'federalization' of the

spill response due to improper removal actions by the
responsible party was not a pelievable threat.

The federal

government did not have the funds, contracting capability,
or organizational capability to move resources as fast as
EXXON could.
The fact that the incident was a major disaster which
would require an extraordinary response effort was
recognized relatively slowly by all parties.

Decision

making during the operation was reactive rather than
proactive--e.g mobilization of beach cleaning forces after
the oil was ashore, establishing a federal and EXXON
organization on Kodiak after the oil had reached the island.
The organization and technology for the massive beach
cleaning operation evolved--neither were considered in prespill plans.
The national contingency planning process has never
fully resolved state--federal relationships during an oil
spill of catastrophic proportions.

The NCP, although

allocating one seat on the RRT to the state, does not ensure
(or require) that states set up a unified command system.
The fragility of the state/federal and intra-state
relationships was acerbated in the EXXON VALDEZ spill by a
number of factors and ADEC had difficulty establishing its
role as the leader of the state response and the state
response organization did not work smoothly with the federal
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OSC until well into the spill response.

Factors which

affected this relationship include the following:
-The Alaskan economy is heavily dependent upon oil
revenues and, to a lessor extent, revenues from its
fishing industry. The oil industry is controlled from
"outside", the fishing industry is predominantly
Alaskan owned.

The spill was perceived as caused by

'outsiders' and the primary economic impact was on the
prime local industry.

The need to close or restrict

fishing and to protect fish spawning areas ensured that
the state Fish and Game had a major role.
-Alaskans had not anticipated that a major spill could
occur and were truly outraged by the 'despoiling' of
Prince William Sound, ensuring that the state response
to the spill would be highly politicized.

The values

prized by Alaskans--self sUfficiency, independence,
small town & village living, pride in the pristine
wilderness--clash with the acceptance of the economic
giant of the oil companies.
-The State of Alaska is a major landowner in the Prince
William Sound area, ensuring that the Department of
Natural Resources had a key role in the response
effort.
-Native Corporations are major landowners in the Prince
William Sound area and native villages rely on fishing
for sUbsistence.

This made both the political and

social impacts of the spill more complex.
-Coordination between State Emergency Services and the
ADEC during a major environmental disaster had not been
resolved prior to the incident.
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The area of contingency planning should be examined
closely in the wake of the EXXON VALDEZ incident.

We must

be able to create, equip, and manage organizations which are
capable of effectively and efficiently dealing with major
oil spills.
4. Response Tactics
Once the EXXON VALDEZ incident occurred, a 'window of
response' lasted about 72 hours during which effective
mechanical removal of oil from the surface of the water was
possible.

Dispersants and burning techniques were also

effective at the leading edge of the spill.

This window

ended Sunday night when the oil was emulsified by a storm.
After the initial storm on Sunday night, there was 'a window
of lessor opportunity' of about a week, during which there
was still a significant amount of free floating oil which,
although highly emulsified, may have been susceptible to
mechanical pick up.

This period also provided the optimal

time for preventive booming of sensitive areas.
The amount of resources available on scene, accessible
in the region, and in the logistics pipeline (booms,
skimmers, dispersants, burning agents) were not adequate to
take advantage of the first 72 hour 'window of opportunity',
regardless of who was in charge or what organizational
arrangement was used.

A more effective organizational and

command structure and a more responsive marshalling of
resources might have made a difference during the week long
period of lessor opportunity.

During this period, less than

5 % of the oil was contained, removed, dispersed or burned.
With an 'optimal' response another 10-20% of the oil may
have been prevented from reaching shore--but the amount of
shoreline affected would not have been significantly
different.

After the first 10 days, little else could have

been done to reduce the amount of oil that hit the beach,
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although protective booming could still have influenced
where the oil hit.

The spill and its response occurred

under relatively favorable weather conditions.

During

periods of severe weather in Prince William Sound, no amount
of equipment, dispersants, etc would keep the oil from the
beach.
The salvage of the EXXON VALDEZ, although not preplanned, was expertly conducted

in a coordinated effort by

EXXON, CG Marine Safety Office VALDEZ, CG Pacific Strike
Team, and salvors contracted by EXXON.

This successful

salvage prevented up to a million additional bbls of oil
from entering Prince William Sound.
As stated above, response tactics were severely
constrained by resource constraints and by the lack of
federal/state/industry coordination.

The incident did,

however, show that the capability of mechanical containment
and removal technology is still very limited and that the
policies and procedures governing the use of dispersants and
burning agents have not been adequately resolved nor have
tactics for their use been fully developed.
5.

Beach Cleaning Technology and Environmental Impact
Possibly one of the more frustrating aspects of the

EXXON VALDEZ incident was that many of the actions taken to
clean the beaches may have actually had a negative impact on
the environment.

While some amount of beach cleaning is

desirable, there is no consensus on how much is the right
amount.

Similarly, there is no agreement on what technology

or procedures are most appropriate.

Many technologies and

procedures used in the Alaskan beach cleaning operation were
adopted from other industries on short notice.

There is

mixed reaction to the process of using high temperature,
high pressure, hot water, repeated ten or twenty times, to
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clean a beach.

A comprehensive analysis would consider the

pollution caused by the army of more than 10,000 people and
hundreds of boats and planes in the process of beach
cleaning.
6.

Waste management
The Exxon Valdez oil spill resulted in tens of

thousands of tons of oil soaked material that needed to be
disposed of.

Much of this material was biodegradable, such

as floating logs or seaweed on beaches.

Typically,

materials picked up were biodegradable and placed in plastic
bags.

Most of the waste was placed in a hazardous waste

land fill in Arlington, Oregon, one of only two hazardous
waste landfills in the

u.s.

Pacific Northwest.

(The

government did allow some incineration on barges towards the
end of summer).
There are many lessons to be learned in waste disposal
management from the EXXON VALDEZ incident.

The

Environmental Protection Agency could promulgate regulations
for ocean incineration, a process that has dragged on for
many years.

Federal guidelines for the disposal of oily

wastes could provide better alternatives than the use of a
scarce national resource (hazardous waste landfills).

The

development of biodegradable bags and the determination of
the affect of salt water on the oily waste could aid the
clean up process.

7. Risk reduction and response system degradation
All elements of the 'risk reduction' system established
when the pipeline was built had never been reached or were
degraded over time.

Alyeska had cut its full time pollution

response staff and assigned their responsibilities as
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collateral duties; the state accepted this contingent upon
revisions to the contingency plan and increased response
drills.

Alyeska had never established an effective

capability for skimming or storing skimmed oil.

state

pilots were allowed to disembark from tankers north of Bligh
Island.

The Coast Guard reduced its VTS watch from two

persons to one.

The Coast Guard did not establish a

reliable system capable of monitoring ships while they were
in the shipping lanes in Prince William Sound.

Many of the

Coast Guards vessel inspection functions have been delegated
through contracts to the private American Bureau of
Shipping.
The elements of risk reduction which were implemented
in 1978/79 after the Argo Merchant grounding failed to
prevent or to minimize the EXXON VALDEZ incident. Navigation
safety regulations provided passive aids to ship master and
watchstanders (e.g. radar, loran, fathometer, charts).
There were no requirements for 'active' systems which would
alert someone on the ship or in the VTS to the fact that the
ship was standing into danger and that the passive systems
were being ignored or had been disabled.

Even if such

systems existed, there is no maritime or legal tradition or
precedent which would allow anyone to take control of the
vessel away from the master.

The creation of such systems

would, therefore, require a departure from many maritime
traditions.

The segregated ballast protectively located did

not prevent the opening of 11 cargo tanks on the EXXON
VALDEZ.

It is doubtful that the presence of a double. bottom

or a double hull would have prevente~ the escape of any
cargo due to the impact of this extremely high momentum
grounding, and may have complicated the salvage effort.
None of the recommendations for the federally funded
development, purchase, or allocation of pollution response
equipment which resulted from the 1978 investigation of the
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ARGO MERCHANT incident were implemented.

Research into

methods of improving response technology (except for
dispersants and burning agents) was sharply curtailed in the
1980s.
CONCLUSIONS

The direct economic costs of the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill
will be great.

The spill will cost EXXON about $5 million

in lost oil, $20 M in salvage and repair costs, and about
$800 Million in clean up costs.

The potential economic

losses to petroleum companies operating in Alaska are much
greater:

loss of ELF, Bristol Bay leasing moratorium,

potential loss of Alaska natural wildlife refuge (ANWR)
leases.

The magnitude of the economic losses by the Alaskan

people and the state of Alaska will be determined through
extensive legal procedures but are estimated to be in excess
of $1 billion.
Clearly, there is ample economic motivation to
investigate the linkages and trade offs between risk
reduction, contingency planning and pollution response and
to invest significant resources in each of these areas.

The

authors contend that these linkages should be considered in
policy formulation.

For example, it is clear that risk

reduction efforts must focus on scenarios for which counter
measure and mitigation efforts are extremely difficult and
costly.

In the case of chemical releases, evacuation plans

must be in place for areas/incidents where no effective
counter measures exist.

The risks associated with the

transport of hazardous cargo are so great that the pUblic's
right to protection may outweigh traditional values such as
the masters' control of his or her vessel and limitations of
owner's liability.

Increased usage of active versus passive

traffic control and navigation aids may be warranted.
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catastrophic spills have occurred very infrequently,
and have historically been geographically distributed
throughout the world. Effective risk reduction actions will
reduce the probability of their occurrence even further.
Government and industry must be ready to deliver hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of clean-up services anywhere in
the world within hours of an incident.

This means more than

flooding the affected area with people and equipment.

It

means creating functional organizations, capable of making
and implementing decisions and operating according to
doctrine.
As was demonstrated this summer in Prince William
Sound, much work remains to be done before we reach this
ideal.

The EXXON VALDEZ released a cargo of relatively non

toxic crude oil into a very sparsely populated region.

The

environmental impact was significant, but the impact on
human life and health was minor.

The probability of a

collision, ramming or grounding of a ship carrying chemicals
in a port such as New York is small, but is certainly not
zero.

How effectively have we minimized this risk and what

is our capability of responding to such an incident?
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